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A fundamental set of institutional rules that governs
the current stance and future course of public pen-
sion finances relates to the assessment of individual
pension benefits accruing as regular old-age pen-
sions. Other entitlements, e.g. for disability pensions
and survivor benefits, are often derived from these
standard procedures.The following survey may thus
provide useful materials for comparing important
features of pension systems across countries or
investigating their financial viability through in-
depth analyses. It covers qualifying conditions and
pension formulae in the countries of the former EU-
15, plus Switzerland and the US. In addition, special
rules applying to early retirement, the treatment of
spells of unemployment and child-rearing, as well as
the indexation of benefits are included in the survey.
Unless otherwise stated, the legal framework taken
into consideration is that of 2002.1
Qualifying conditions, statutory retirement age
and early retirement
Entitlements to receive old-age pensions are usu-
ally tied to fulfilling certain qualifying conditions,
notably having worked or having paid contribu-
tions for some minimum time span. In countries
with universal pension schemes that are meant to
provide some basic amount of pension benefits to
the entire population, similar rules exist regarding
the period of residence. Longer periods of labour
force participation, in which contributions are
being paid, or longer periods of stay are required
for entitlements to receive a “full” amount of ben-
efits based on the standard pension formula, i.e.,
earnings-related benefits without any reduction or
a maximum basic amount. Once, these qualifying
conditions are met, withdrawing benefits is usual-
ly possible starting from a specified age, the statu-
tory retirement age.Earlier receipt of old-age pen-
sions is often possible, but may be subject to
reductions of annual benefits that go beyond the
pure effect of shorter work biographies. Table 1
summarises the main qualifying conditions for
public pension schemes operated in the countries
covered here.
The figure shows the statutory retirement age for
both males and females and compares it with the
effective age at withdrawal from the labour mar-
ket observed in the same set of countries. In some
countries, there is no statutory retirement age in
the strict sense of the word; there – e.g., in the US
– we use information regarding the age threshold
from which old-age pensions can be received with-
out any reduction due to early retirement.
Changes in statutory retirement ages are under
way, or are already scheduled for a more remote
future, in several cases. For instance, in the US the
threshold embodied in social security legislation is
currently being increased and will reach 67 for
males as well as females in 2027. In Denmark, on
the other hand, the statutory retirement age is
being reduced from 67 to 65 for both sexes starting
from 2004. Lower thresholds applying to women
are, or will be, abolished in Austria (between 2024
and 2033), Belgium (in 2009), Germany (until
2005), Greece (for those entering insurance 1993
or later), the UK (between 2010 and 2020); in
Switzerland, the threshold for women will be
increased to age 64 in 2005.
Building on the current legislation,the statutory,or
legally-defined, retirement age is thus basically 65
throughout the countries considered here at some
point in time in the future.The main exceptions are
the US and France, where it will continue to be at
age 60 for males and females. Only in Italy and
Switzerland, will there be a lower statutory retire-
ment age (60 and 64, respectively) for females.
Nevertheless, the figure also demonstrates that the
statutory retirement age is not a good predictor for
actual retirement decisions. Figures regarding the
effective age at withdrawal from the labour market
given there are taken from Scherer (2002). They
include exits that do not immediately lead to old-
age pension take-up but,according to national laws
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1The materials collected here are taken from a comparative survey
prepared by researchers based at Ifo’s departments for Social
Policy and Labour Markets and for Public Finance (R. Fenge et al.
2003). The Ifo Institute was commissioned with this study by the
German Federal Department of Finance. Information provided in
this survey is based on various sources, above all on the MIS-
SOC_online database set up by the EU Commission (2001) and the
reports on “Social Security Programs Throughout the World” col-
lected by the U.S. Social Security Administration (2002-03), aug-
mented and validated by extensive research in the Internet plat-
forms of national pension administrations.and habits in this area, may imply a period of for-
mal unemployment or disability, with other cate-
gories of benefits being received.Results are based
on contingent exit probabilities and calculated in a
similar fashion as life expectancies, given the rele-
vant mortality rates.2
Effective ages at withdrawal show much more vari-
ation across countries than legally-defined retire-
ment ages would imply. In more than half of the
countries, the former is substantially lower than the
latter; only Portuguese men as well as Austrian and
British women appear to work even longer than
required by pension law. In spite of different levels,
the ranking of countries is almost identical for
males and females, with Luxembourg and Italy hav-
ing very low effective retirement ages in both cases,
and Portugal and the US having rather high ones.
Finland and France appear to be particular in that
both sexes effectively retire at similar ages there.
The case of France also illustrates that statutory
retirement ages are not the only rules affecting
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Table 1
Qualifying conditions for regular old-age pensions
a)
Minimum qualification periods Entitlements to receive full benefits
b)
A 15 years of contributions, or 25 years of insurance, or
15 years of insurance within the last 30 years
40 years of insurance
B None 45 years in employment (women: 43 years;
increased to 45 until 2009)
CH 1 year of contributions 44 years of contributions (women: 40 years)
D 60 months of contributions Reaching the statutory retirement age
DK Basic pension (Folkepension): 3 years of residence
starting from age 15 (foreigners: 10 years, 5 of which
immediately preceding retirement)
40 years of residence starting from age 15
Supplementary pension (ATP): none Non-fragmented record of contributions
Premium pension (SP): none Not defined
E 15 years of contributions, 2 of which within the 15 years
immediately preceding retirement
35 years of contributions
F 1 quarter of insurance 159 quarters of insurance (160 starting from 2003)
GR 4,500 work days of contributions 35 years of contributions (if membership started
before 1993: 10,500 work days)
I 20 years of contributions 37 years of contributions (35 years starting from
age 57)
IRL 24 weeks of contributions per year on average (10 for
Old-Age [Contributory] Pensions); 260 weeks of
contributions in total (520 starting from April 2012);
coverage starting at least 10 years before retirement
48 weeks of contributions per year on average
LUX 10 years of insurance (contributions are rebated if
condition is not met)
40 years of insurance
NL None Residence from age 15 to 65
P 15 years of contributions or other pensionable periods 40 years of contributions
S None Not defined
SF Basic pension (Kansaneläke): 3 years of residence
starting from age 16
40 years of residence starting from age 16; no
earnings-related benefits or foreign pensions
Supplementary pension (Työeläke): 1 year of
contributions on annual wages exceeding o 690.97
(2002); self-employed and farmers: none
40 years in employment
UK Basic pension: 10 years of contributions 44 years of contributions (women: 39 years)
Supplementary pension (SERPS
c)): passing once the
income limit of 3,415 £ or 5,285 r p.a. (2002)
Not defined
USA At least 1 quarter of insurance per year starting from
age 21
Not defined
a) For benefit entitlements before reaching the statutory retirement age: see Table 2. – 
b) I.e., earnings-related benefits
without any reduction or a maximum basic amount. – 
c) In 2002–03: replaced by the State Second Pension (“S2P”).
2 Here, we use the latest “static estimates” available that Scherer
(2002) prepared using cross-section data referring to 1999 or earlier
years. For Belgium the latest relevant observations were from 1976.CESifo DICE Report 2/2004 57
Research Reports
actual retirement decisions. In addition, opportuni-
ties to retire early (see Table 2) as well as the rules
governing disability pensions and unemployment
benefits are potentially important here. The fact
that there are no early-retirement options in
France may thus explain that the effective age at
withdrawal of French males is in a similar range as
those in Luxembourg, Italy and Finland. More
generous rules regarding early retirement usually
imply that the difference between statutory and
effective retirement ages is larg-
er. Exceptions are Finland and
the Netherlands, where it is
access to unemployment bene-
fits and disability pensions,
respectively, which creates the
huge gaps. In both cases, the rel-
evant laws can be seen as creat-
ing alternative channels towards
early retirement for older work-
ers with poor prospects for re-
employment.
In most countries, drawing on
old-age pensions before reaching
the legally-defined retirement
age is possible, though often
under additional conditions
regarding individual work
biographies only. Also, benefits
are usually reduced against the
amount of old-age pensions that
would accrue given the same
work biography if the statutory
retirement age were reached. On
the other hand, reductions are
often smaller than would be
required for actuarial fairness,
considering the shorter period
where contributions are made
and the extended period of
retirement.3 Table 2 summarises
the rules regarding early retire-
ment with (reduced) entitlements to receive old-
age pensions.4 Note that the reduction rates given
there are meant to reduce current pension benefits
over what the effect of a shorter work record, or a
smaller number of years with contributions, would
be in pension schemes with benefits related to
earnings or contributions.
Pension formulae and indexation of benefits
Upon retirement, old-age pension benefits are
assessed using the (standard) pension formula
applied in each country. In most cases, it establishes
a functional relation between average covered earn-
ings received during the insurance period – usually
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Data for Germany relate to West-Germany only; results indicated for Germany, Greece, 
the Netherlands and Sweden are based on 1998 data, those for Ireland and 
Luxembourg on 1995 data.
Females
Age (by years)
Statutory retirement age (old-age pensions, 2002)




3 For more detailed analyses see, for instance, Blöndal und
Scarpetta (1999). Calculating reductions that are actuarially fair
requires specific information regarding contribution rates, future
benefit levels, life expectancies and potential peculiarities of the
standard benefit formula. Results are also contingent on the dis-
count rate assumed for calculating present values, or on how it
relates to the rate used for indexing benefits. Furthermore, actuar-
ially fair reductions are not linear in the number of years of early
pension take-up and thus cannot be represented by uniform rates.
Rough calculations for the case of Germany indicate that fair
reductions should be between 7 percent and 9 percent a year in this
country.It may not be appropriate to apply the same result to other
countries with different pension arrangements,but only in Finland,
Greece,Switzerland,Spain,and the US,annual reductions are like-
ly to come close to being actuarially fair.
4 Special early-retirement programmes that exist, or existed, in
countries with severe umemployment problems are not covered
here.the length of this period on the one hand and
monthly or annual benefits at award on the other.
Often,the assessment is not based on all the years
of insurance but only on a limited number of
(“best”) years with the highest earnings. In basic
pension schemes, benefits are more uniform but
never entirely a lump sum. Instead, with shorter
insurance periods they are usually reduced pro
rata temporis. Table 3 describes in some detail,
how pension benefits are being assessed in the dif-
ferent countries. There are some common pat-
terns across countries,mainly relating to the ques-
tion of whether national pension systems are
mainly based on Bismarckian “social insurance”
schemes, with earnings-related benefits, or on the
Beveridgean model, where flat-rate pensions
dominate the picture (cf. Werding 2003 for an
extended discussion). But the precise formula
used for assessing pension benefits is nowhere 
he same.
After award,i.e.,during the retirement period,further
adjustments in individual amounts of benefits depend
on the method of indexation (see Table 4). As a rule,
there are annual up-ratings that either correspond to
CPI inflation,such that benefits are constant over time
on real terms, or follow the growth rate of wages. In
the latter case, pensions keep track of increases in the
living standard of the active population; at the same
time, any growth in productivity or wages does not
alleviate financing for current pensions – on a pay-as-
you-go basis,as this is mostly done – but leads to high-
er benefit entitlements which have to be met by cur-
rent contributions. The countries considered here are
about evenly split between these two approaches,
additional regulations or discretionary deviations
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Table 2
Conditions for early retirement
Early take-up of old-age pensions possible...
From age... With annual reductions by... Additional conditions
A 61.5
(56.5 for women)
(Depending on age and
insurance period)
None





(3.4 % for women born 1942− 47)
None
D6 3
(60 for unemployed born
before 1952 and women)
62
starting from 2012
3.6 % 35 years of insurance
(Unemployed: 15 years, 8 of which during the
last 10 years; women: 25 years, 10 of which
after age 40)
35 years of insurance
DK Folkepension: 60 91% (100%) of unemployment
benefits at age 60–62 (62–65)
25 years of contributions to a private early
retirement fund
ATP (–2004): 65 5 % None
E 60 8% (7% in cases of
unvoluntary withdrawal)
Entitlements built up before 1967 or in cases
of heavy or dangerous work
F –– –
GR 60 6 % 15 years of contributions (membership
before 1993: 4,500 work days)
I 57 depending on age 35 years of contributions
(40 years: no age threshold)
IRL –– –
LUX 57 – 40 years of insurance
NL –– –
P 55 4.5 % (0 % for unemployed
aged 60 or above)
30 years of contributions
S –– –
SF 60 Basic Pension: actuarial reduction None
Supplementary Pension: 4.8 % None
UK –– –
USA 62 6.67 % for the first 3 years
(5% for further years)
NoneCESifo DICE Report 2/2004 59
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Table 3
Pension formulae for (standard) old-age pensions at award





a) x years of insurance
b) x 2% x 14/12
c)
a) Average monthly earnings in the “best” 15 years of insurance
(indexed to wages) x 15/17.5
b)  Up to a max. of 40 years; minus 1.5 years per year of early take up









a) For years before 1955: q 10,788; 1955–1980: gross earnings without an upper
limit (blue-collar workers, 1955− 1957: q 52 per day); starting from 1980: gross
earnings below the upper limit
b) 75% for beneficiaries with dependent spouses




a) x Minimum pension (MP, 2001: CHF 1,030, q 700.50)
+ G2
b) x (reference income
c) + child-rearing credit
d))
a)  G1 = 0.74 (1.04 if benefit > 36 x MP; 2.00 if benefit > 48 x MP)
b)  G2 = 13/600 (8/600 if benefit > 36 x MP; 0 if benefit > 48 x MP)
c)  Average annual earnings (indexed to CPI inflation and wages)




a) x current pension base amount
b)
a)  Sum of annual earnings points (ratio of individual gross earnings over average
gross earnings of those actively insured in each year) x pension award factor
(= 1.0 at the statutory retirement age)
b)  Variable base amount for assessing monthly benefits (adjusted annually);






a) x years of residence
b)/40
a)  Depending on marital status; reduced if beneficiaries continue to work




Contributions + interest earned
(small benefits are paid out as a lump sum)
Premium pension (SP):
Contributions




a) x benefit factor
b)
a)  During the last 15 years (indexed to CPI inflation) / 17.5
b)  50% for the first 15 years of insurance + 3% for each year between 15 and 25








a) Average annual earnings in the “best” 20 years of insurance (indexed to wages,
25 years until 2008)
b) = 50% at age 65 (50% – 1.25% x  no. of quarters missing)




a) x years of insurance x 1.714% / 12
a) Average annual earnings of the last 5 years of insurance




a) x conversion coefficient
b) /12
a)  Indexed to average GDP growth in the last 5 years
b) Depending on retirement age (between 57 and 65)




Average no. of 
contributions                                      Pension benefit (2002)                                    
48 or higher  q147.30 x no. of weeks per month





Average no. of 
contributions                                      Pension benefit (2002)                                  
48 or higher  q 147.30 x no. of weeks per month
20 – 47 q 144.40 x no. of weeks per month
15 – 19 q 110.50 x no. of weeks per month
10 −  14 q   73.70 x no. of weeks per monthsometimes making sure that pensions are subject to
standard-of-living, not just cost-of-living, adjustments
even where the basic rule is CPI indexation.
What the standard pension formula often does not
reveal is that, in addition to periods of labour force
participation with contributions being paid to the
pension system, some privileged elements of typical
work biographies – in particular,spells of unemploy-
ment and child-rearing – may be included in one way
or another in the assessment of pension benefits.
This is where we will turn before concluding.
Treatment of spells of unemployment and
non-participation
In virtually all public pension schemes where ben-
efits are tied to the number of years of insurance,
or to wages earned or contributions made during
this period, benefit formulae are augmented by
specific rules on how to treat certain times of non-
employment or non-participation. Important
examples are given by periods of schooling or
other forms of education or formal training, mili-
tary services, unemployment, sickness or other
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a)/12 x 1.78% x adjustment
b)
+ CPI x q 36,4716 x years of insurance
c)/40
a) Indexed to CPI inflation
b)  Standard-of-living adjustment (2002 = 1.257)
c) Up to a maximum of 40 years




a) x 0.02 x years of residence
b)
a) Singles:  q 912.69 per month; couples, if dependent spouse reaches age 65 before
2003: q 1,258.22 per month (2002)




a) x years of insurance
b) x 2% x 14/12
c)
a) Average indexed monthly earnings of the “best” 10 out of the last 15 years of
insurance (indexed to CPI inflation)
b)  With at least 120 days covered with earnings






a) x life-expectancy coefficient
b) /12
a)  Indexed to wages (deduction for administrative costs)
b)  Based on contingent cohort life expectancy (at age 65)
Premium pension:
Contributions







a) x years of residence/40
a) Between p 390 and j 464 depending on marital status and community of







a) / 12 x (1.5% x years of insurance at age 23− 59
+ 2.5% x years of insurance at age 60–65)
b)
a)  Avearge annual earnings of the last 10 years




Full weekly flat rate
a) x pension factor
b) x weeks per month
a)  Singles: £ 75.50 (o 124.60); couples: £ 120.70 (r 199.20; 2002)
b)  100% with 44 years of insurance (39 years for women; increased to 44 between
2010 and 2020), 25% with 10 years of insurance, close to linear adjustment with






b) / years of contributions
a)  Earnings above the lower earnings limit (indexed to CPI inflation)
b)  Linear reduction to 20% between 1998/99 and 2009/10.
(Formula redefined for the new “S2P” system starting from 2002/03; accrual factors




a) x PIA factor
b)
a)  Average indexed monthly earnings in the “best” 35 years of insurance (indexed
to wages).
b)  The first $ 592 of averaged indexed earnings are weighted with 90%, between
$ 592 and $ 3,567 the weight is 32%, above  $ 3,567 the weight is 15% (earnings
thresholds: 2002)
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forms of incapacity to work, motherhood, or an
extended period of time during which parents may
take care of small children. In systems where ben-
efits are tied to residence alone, special rules
applying in these cases do not make sense. In sys-
tems where benefits are basically a flat rate, defin-
ing a maximum time frame to be taken into
account in each of these cases suffices. But in sys-
tems with earnings-related benefits, both the time
to be taken into account and the value to be
attached to it needs to be defined.Like the pension
formulae themselves, national regulations in these
areas are very diverse. We therefore confine our
attention to roughly indicating whether or not
there are special rules applying in the two cases of
unemployment and periods of child-rearing,
adding a few remarks on the nature of these rules
where appropriate.
In the presence of high-level unemployment that
many European countries are continuously faced
with since the 1970s, rules
regarding the inclusion of unem-
ployment spells in the assess-
ment of old-age pensions are
obviously important. Where
they exist, these rules sometimes
limit the maximum period of
time to be taken into account
(e.g., in Greece) or they are
effective only as long as there
are entitlements to receive spe-
cific types of unemployment
benefits (in Austria, Denmark,
Germany, or Italy). On the other
hand,no such rules exist in some
countries even if pension bene-
fits are related to earnings or
contributions (in Switzerland,
Luxembourg, Sweden, and the
US, for instance).
Starting from different levels,
there is a uniform trend towards
higher female labour force par-
ticipation across all the coun-
tries considered here. Taking
into account the changes in the
division of labour between men
and women within couples and
families, pension reforms often
aim at establishing models with
higher independent, non-
derived benefit entitlements for females. As
extended periods of child-related non-participa-
tion are effectively far more important for the typ-
ical biographies of women, rules regarding the
treatment of these spells in the assessment of pen-
sion benefits are an important element of such
models.5 Where they exist, the relevant rules are
often very recent or have been amended during
the last few years. Usually, they are neutral in that
they can be applied to either parent of a given
child (or to both parents for different sub-periods
of a parental leave). Again, special rules meant to
compensate for benefits foregone are not needed
where benefit entitlements are not, or only to a
very limited extent, linked to individual earnings
Table 4 
Indexation of benefits after award 
  CPI 
indexation 
Wage 
indexation  Remarks 
A    9  Net wages 
B  9    Max. 2% + annual standard-of-
living increase 
CH  9  9  Mean 




Gross wages .\. pension 
contributions .\. rate of 
subsidised savings 
DK  





Up to –0.3%, if       > 2.0% 
  Supplementary 
pension (ATP): 
    Only if reserves sufficient 
E   9    
F  9    
GR    9   
I  9 
 
  100% to 75% of i, depending 
on the amount of benefits 
IRL      Discretionary 
LUX  9    
NL    9  Bargained wages 
P  9    
S  9    + GDP growth – 1.6% 
SF  





  Suppl. pension 
(Työeläke): 
9  9  Weighted 80 : 20 
UK  9    
USA  9  9  The latter if   w i ˆ >
w ˆ
5 In unfunded pension schemes, rules of this kind may also be
important for another reason: since future benefits derived from
these schemes are effectively funded through the human capital
embodied in current children, including periods of child-rearing in
the definition of benefits – irrespective of the labour force partici-
pation of care-taking parents – may be appropriate to internalise a
potential externality.See,e.g.,Cigno (1993) or Sinn (1997) for a dis-
cussion of the economic rationale of such policies.or contributions. Given that, they are basically
absent only in Belgium and the US, as well as in
the supplementary pension schemes in Denmark,
Finland and the UK.
Table 5 summarises the rules regarding the inclu-
sion of unemployment spells and periods of child-
rearing in the assessment of old-age pension bene-
fits in all the countries covered here.
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Table 5
Spells of unemployment or child-rearing in the benefit assessment
Inclusion of unemployment spells... Inclusion of child-rearing spells...
A ! (For periods with unemployment insurance
benefits)
! (Up to 48 months per child if insured individual
ever paid contributions)
B !!  (Motherhood leave)
CH – ! (Fictitious supplements to wages earned until
children reach age 16)
D ! (For periods with unemployment benefits) ! (36 months per child are being counted as insur-
ance period, with contributions on 100% of average
earnings being paid from the general government
budget; with less-than-average earnings:  increase in
earnings – related entitlements built up during the 7
days that follow; increase in survivor benefits)
DK Basic pension (Folkepension): ––
Supplementary pension (ATP): ! (for periods with
benefits from the labour market re-integration
programme, contributions being paid by the
responsible benefit administration)
! (Motherhood leave, with contributions being paid
by the responsible benefit administration)
Premium pension (SP): ––
E !!  (First year of parental leave per child under 3 is
being counted as insurance period)
F !!  (8 quarters per child taken care of for nine years
or more until age 16 are being added to the insurance
period; alternatively, up to three years of parental
leave can be accounted for)
GR ! (For periods with unemployment insurance
benefits for up to 200 days during the last 10 years
before entering retirement)
! (Between 3 and 6 months of parental leave are
being counted as insurance period; for mothers, early
retirement is possible starting from age 55)
I ! (For periods with unemployment insurance
benefits)
! (Motherhood leave; up to 6 months of parental
leave are being counted as insurance period; for
mothers, the statutory retirement age is reduced by
up to 12 months; alternatively, mothers can opt for
an increased “conversion coefficient” ficticiously
extending their work record by up to 2 years)
IRL !!  (For Old-Age (contributory) pensions, the number
of qualifying years is reduced by up to 20 years per
year of child-care of children under age 12)
LUX – ! (24 months per child are being counted as
insurance period, 48 months if at least two other
children are living in the household)
NL ––
P !!  (Up to 2 years of parental leave per child can be
accounted for)
S Income pension (Inkomstpension): – ! (up to 4 years of parental leave per child can be
accounted for, based on the “best” out of three
alternative approaches generating different results
for different work records before and during the
child-care period)
Premium pension (Premiereservsystem): ––
SF Basic pension (Kansaneläke): – ! (If parental leave lasts for up to 1 year)
Supplementary pension (Työeläke): – –
UK Basic pension: ! (if individuals are actively seeking
employment)
! (The number of qualifying years is reduced to a
minimum of 20 years through child-care for children
under age 16 as one out of several “home
responsibilities”)
Supplementary pension (SERPS): ––
USA ––CESifo DICE Report 2/2004 63
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Conclusion
Even with detailed information regarding the defi-
nition of old-age pension benefits, assessing the
generosity of national pension schemes on a com-
parative basis is not an easy task.A number of dif-
ficulties can, in principle, be dealt with using the
kind of information provided here, viz. those aris-
ing from differing approaches to redistributing
income between individuals or households along-
side many dimensions – with respect to life-time
earnings, timing and length of the insurance peri-
od, spells of unemployment and non-participation,
plus some other details not fully covered in this
survey. Once a set of comparable households of
pensioners is defined – comparable, first of all, in
terms of household composition,income levels and
work records – one could determine the benefit
entitlements that accrue in each of these cases and
in each country and relate them to earlier house-
hold income or wage earnings (thus obtaining
“replacement rates” that are corrected for interna-
tional differences in income or wage levels) or
average household incomes of younger cohorts
(obtaining “quasi-replacement rates” which then
reflect the relative income position of people in
retirement vis-à-vis those who are currently
active). Considering the various differences in rel-
evant rules, it is unlikely that comparisons of this
kind would offer a very clear-cut picture. For
example, the ranking of benefit levels may not be
invariant with respect to the levels of covered
earnings or the total length (and specific nature) of
spells of unemployment and non-participation.
So far, detailed calculations regarding old-age pen-
sion benefits that are based on more than just one
standard biography of pensioners – usually with a
next-to complete record of labour force participa-
tion – are however lacking. In existing work (see,
e.g., OECD 2001 for the most careful approach to
doing such calculations for only nine countries),
even the coverage of different countries is rather
limited.Yet, what the results derived from compar-
ative studies suggest6 is that, in terms of “quasi-
replacement rates” based on total retirement
income, pensioners around the world enjoy a rela-
tively uniform standard of living (at between 85
and 100 per cent of per-capita income of individu-
als in their active period of life).At the same time,
the role of public pensions, or the “public–private
mix”, within total retirement income of typical
pensioners may be very different across the coun-
tries considered here. This should be kept in mind
as the major source of heterogeneity of national
pension systems (see, again, Werding 2003) if the
information provided in this survey were used to
spell out differences in existing public pension
schemes in more detail than it is usually done.
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